‘Signals on Arms Control’

Your Jan. 29 editorial “Signals on Arms Control” suggests that the Bush Administration’s recent rhetorical “signals of restraint” on the strategic defense initiative marks a “bold departure from the traditional White House approach to arms control.” In point of fact unilateral arms control has been a periodic component of U.S. policy. However, its ability to induce Moscow to respond in kind is mixed.

On the down side the Soviets never reciprocated U.S. decisions not to deploy ABM, IRBM’s in Europe, anti-satellite weapons and a 1969 moratorium on the production of chemical weapons. On the up side U.S. unilateral actions not to orbit nuclear weapons in space (1962), not to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere (1963), to cut production of high enriched uranium (1964), to withdraw troops from Europe (1964) and to cease production of biological weapons (1969) served to spark Soviet reciprocation that in some cases was consummated in formal conventions. Often the motive behind these initiatives reflected more a military or other inutility of the phenomenon restrained than an effort to contain the arms competition generally. Thus Washington cut back the production of high enriched uranium because it had an overabundance; it ceased atmospheric nuclear test in response to environmental concerns knowing that it had an underground testing alternative; it stopped producing biological weapons because battlefield use was impractical.

Congress has played a greater role in unilaterally restraining American arms than The Times suggests. During the Reagan years, in addition to slowing development of anti-satellite systems, Congress withheld funds for the MX and later limited its numbers, fought for a narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty, cut allocation requests for SDI and postponed testing of a 12-warhead Trident II.

Whether, as The Times implies, unilateral initiatives will be materially more fruitful in controlling arms in the current Soviet-American detente than heretofore is a matter worth exploring. However, we must concede that along with apparent advantages--namely, avoidance of prolonged negotiations--unilateral restraint is no panacea. Because it is not subject to verification, cheating is easier than codified arms control. And because it is not embodied in a treaty, it is more easily reversible.

BENNETT RAMBERG

Senior Research Associate

UCLA Center for International

and Strategic Affairs